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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 13-cv-1233) 
District Judge: Hon. Cathy Bissoon 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
 







SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Paul J. McArdle appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his case on statute of 
limitations grounds.  Because McArdle filed his Complaint after the limitations period 




As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.1  McArdle, a Pittsburgh-based attorney, filed a complaint 
against Verizon Pennsylvania in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania on May 29, 2007, claiming that Verizon Pennsylvania negligently 
“misplaced” listings and advertisements he purchased for publication in the 2006 and 
2007 editions of the company’s telephone directories.  App. 14-16.  In his amended 
complaint, McArdle sought to add Verizon Pennsylvania’s parent company, Verizon 
Communications Inc., as a defendant but in fact named a different entity.  In its answer 
filed on July 14, 2008, Verizon Pennsylvania informed McArdle that he had named 
Verizon Communications, Inc., another subsidiary of Verizon Communications Inc., 
whose name differed from that of the parent company by a single comma.2     
Despite this disclosure, McArdle did not seek leave to correct his complaint.  
Eventually, summary judgment was entered in favor of Verizon Communications, Inc.  
The Superior Court affirmed, and on December 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied McArdle’s petition for review.     
On August 27, 2013, McArdle filed this federal Complaint against the parent 
                                                 
1 The facts recounted here are drawn from the Complaint, and because we are 
reviewing an order that dismissed a case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we accept 
all facts in the Complaint as true.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
2 Specifically, Verizon Pennsylvania pleaded that “plaintiff appears to have 
confused defendant, Verizon Communications, Inc., with a non-party with a very similar 
name, Verizon Communications Inc.”  App. 19. 
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company, Verizon Communications Inc., in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging it engaged in common law fraud.  McArdle asserted that Verizon 
Communications Inc. registered with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “a plethora of 
fictitious names, wholly-owned subsidiary business corporations, and wholly-owned 
subsidiary limited liability corporations so as to confuse its customers and the authorities 
as to whom they were dealing with.”3  App. 6.  He also alleged that sales representatives 
operating out of Verizon Communication Inc.’s office used disingenuous business cards 
bearing the names of various unregistered companies.  He also claimed that Verizon 
Communications Inc., acting through its subsidiaries, made misrepresentations in state 
court and sought to inject other businesses into the litigation “for the purpose of 
distracting liability away from the Verizon named entity . . . .”  App. 18. 
On September 3, 2013, Verizon Communications Inc. moved to dismiss the 
Complaint on the ground that McArdle’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.4  
                                                 
3 Between 2000 and 2013, Verizon Communications Inc. had registered at least 66 
such names and registered and subsequently cancelled or withdrawn an additional 26 
names.   
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) allows certain defenses to be raised by motion, but the rule 
does not include a statute of limitations defense among them.  In this Circuit, however, a 
limitations defense may be asserted in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) if “the time alleged 
in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the 
statute of limitations.”  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  However, “[i]f the bar is not apparent on the face 
of the complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6).”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  As discussed 
herein, the allegations contained in the Complaint demonstrate that McArdle’s claim was 
brought after the limitations period expired.  Therefore, the District Court did not err in 
considering Verizon Communication Inc.’s limitations defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
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At the Court’s direction, the parties then submitted forms, in which McArdle declined to 
consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction and elected instead to have the case assigned to a 
district judge.  Following assignment of the case to the District Judge but absent a referral 
order on the docket, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, in which 
he recommended that the District Court grant Verizon Communication Inc.’s motion to 
dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.5  Over McArdle’s objections, the District Judge 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and granted Verizon 
Communication Inc.’s motion to dismiss.  McArdle now appeals.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of a 
district court’s order dismissing a complaint.  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 
212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  We “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the 
                                                 
5 We find no error in the Magistrate Judge’s issuance of the Report and 
Recommendation following McArdle’s election to have the case assigned to a District 
Judge.  The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, requires neither the consent of the 
parties nor an order that refers a matter to a magistrate judge for a report and 
recommendation.  In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1998).  Moreover, 
the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania provide that “[i]f a party elects to have the case assigned to a District Judge, 
the Magistrate Judge shall continue to manage the case by deciding non-dispositive 
motions and submitting reports and recommendations on dispositive motions, unless 
otherwise directed by the District Judge.”  LCvR 72(G).  Thus, the issuance of the Report 
and Recommendation was permissible under our precedent and the local rules of the 
District Court.  Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) does not require a magistrate 
judge to hold a hearing prior to issuing a report and recommendation.  Garcia v. City of 
Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2000).   
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complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. 
 McArdle argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his Complaint based 
upon the statute of limitations.  In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for fraud claims 
is two years.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7).  “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as 
soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises . . . .”  Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc. 
v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983).  It is tolled, however, “until the 
plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the 
injury and its cause.”  Beauty Time, Inc. v. VU Skin Sys., Inc., 118 F.3d 140, 144 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “[L]ack of knowledge, 
mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the statute of limitations, even though a person 
may not discover his injury until it is too late to take advantage of the appropriate remedy 
. . . .”  Pocono, 468 A.2d at 471 (citation omitted). 
Here, the alleged misrepresentations concerning the identity of Verizon 
Communications Inc., namely the registration of numerous subsidiaries and the 
distribution of business cards bearing the names of unregistered businesses, occurred 
before McArdle filed his state court action in 2007.  McArdle was informed on July 14, 
2008 that he had named the wrong defendant, and so he knew, or through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, the identity of the party allegedly responsible 
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for his injury no later than that date.  The two year limitations period, therefore, began no 
later than July 14, 2008, and expired two years later.  Because McArdle’s fraud claim 
was not filed until August 27, 2013, it is barred by the statute of limitations.  
McArdle’s argument that damages did not “become certain,” and the limitations 
period did not begin to run, until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his petition 
for review on December 27, 2012, fails.  McArdle seems to contend that Verizon 
Communications Inc. defrauded him by its alleged failure to reveal the true wrongdoer 
and that it was only when the courts in Pennsylvania told him that he had no claim 
against the party he chose to sue that he was injured.  As previously discussed, McArdle 
learned that he had pursued his claim against the wrong party in 2008.  Neither his failure 
to take advantage of the opportunity to amend the state complaint to name the proper 
defendant nor the decision of a court concerning the improper defendant changes the date 
on which he knew of the alleged wrongful act. See Pocono, 468 A.2d at 471.  His mistake 
concerning the proper party and his decision to nonetheless proceed against a different 
defendant despite being told of his error do not toll the statute of limitations.  Therefore, 
the District Court correctly dismissed the Complaint on the ground that his claim accrued 
in 2008 and the present action was filed beyond the two year statute of limitations.6 
                                                 
6 McArdle also argues that the District Court erred in its evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the pleadings under Twombly and Iqbal.  As the District Court properly 
dismissed the Complaint on statute of limitations grounds, we need not consider 
McArdle’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the pleadings. 
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McArdle’s argument that the dismissal of the Complaint violates his Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial is also without merit.  The Seventh Amendment preserves 
the right to a jury trial in cases where there are issues of fact to be determined.  Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).  Where, as here, a district court 
concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim, the district 
court’s legal determination does not invade the province of the jury and, therefore, does 
not violate his Seventh Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 
1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[The] Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not 
abridged, because . . . the complaints failed as a matter of law to present an issue for 
trial.”); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Major Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.9 
(2007) (“In recognizing Congress’ or the Federal Rule makers’ authority to adopt special 
pleading rules, we have detected no Seventh Amendment impediment.”); Walker v. N.M. 
& S. P. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (“The seventh amendment . . . does not attempt 
to regulate matters of pleading or practice . . . .”). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
